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Articles
Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801:
A Quandary for Federal Courts
David E. Seidelson*
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."' Rule 801(a) defines a "statement" as "(1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion."'2 It becomes apparent that the existence of a "statement" as defined in Rule 801(a) is a condition
precedent to the existence of hearsay as defined in Rule 801(c).
And under 801(a), an "assertion" is required for a "statement."
Thus, if there is no assertion, there is no hearsay. So far, so good.
In fact, it's nearly self-apparent. The Advisory Committee Note to
801(a), however, seems to go well beyond the apparent conclusions
set forth in the Rule.
The Note provides that: "The effect of the definition of 'statement' is to exclude from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an asser* Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. FED. R. EvID. 801(c) (emphasis added). All of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
annotations thereto, may be found at FED. R. EVID., 28 U.S.C.A. (1975).

2.

FED.

R. EVID. 801(a).
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tion. The key to the definition is that nothing is an assertion
unless intended to be one." s The Note then identifies five categories of extrajudicial declarations or conduct: (1) verbal assertions,
(2) nonverbal conduct intended to be assertive, (3) nonverbal conduct not intended to be assertive, (4) nonassertive verbal conduct,
and (5) assertive verbal conduct.4
1. Verbal Assertions
With regard to verbal assertions, the Note states that "[i]t can
scarcely be doubted that an assertion made in words is intended by
the declarant to be an assertion. Hence, verbal assertions readily
fall into the category of 'statement.'" If a witness offered to testify to another's extrajudicial declaration, "That red Buick was doing eighty," for the purpose of proving the speed of the vehicle, we
would have a clear example of hearsay. Put category (1), verbal
assertions, in the hearsay column.
2.

Nonverbal Conduct Intended to be Assertive

With regard to nonverbal conduct intended to be assertive, the
Note reads, "[s]ome nonverbal conduct, such as the act of pointing
to identify a suspect in a lineup, is clearly the equivalent of words,
assertive in nature, and to be regarded as a statement." Other examples might include an affirmative nod of the head, a negative
rotation of the head, or an I-don't-know shrug of the shoulders.
Put category (2), nonverbal conduct intended to be assertive, in
the hearsay column.
3.

Nonverbal Conduct not Intended to be Assertive

As to nonverbal conduct not intended to be assertive, the Note
provides:
Other nonverbal conduct, however, may be offered as evidence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the existence of the condition
sought to be proved, from which belief the existence of the condition may
be inferred. This sequence is, arguably, in effect an assertion of the exis3. FED. R. EvD. 801(a) advisory committee note (emphasis added).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. It should be noted that the characterization of "pointing to identify a suspect in
a lineup" as hearsay is limited by FED. R. EVD. 801(d)(1)(C): "A statement is not hearsay if
*..the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him .

. . ." FED.

R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
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tence of the condition and hence properly includable within the hearsay
concept. . . . Admittedly evidence of this character is untested with respect
to the perception, memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor,
but the Advisory Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal
in the absence of an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds. No class of evidence is free of the possibility of
fabrication, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive verbal conduct. The situations giving rise to the7 nonverbal conduct are such as
virtually to eliminate questions of sincerity.

The language used in this rather lengthy excerpt from the Note
raises several questions.
First, why that long (forty-one word) and somewhat convoluted
first sentence? Why didn't the Advisory Committee simply state,
"Some nonverbal conduct may be equivalent to an implied assertion of the fact believed by the actor." I think I may know the
answer. Given the Committee's desire to characterize such nonverbal conduct as nonhearsay, it might have been awkward to use the
word "assertion." Still, if the shorter, more direct sentence would
be accurately descriptive, its use would not necessarily conflict
with the Committee's conclusion that such conduct should be
treated as nonhearsay, assuming the validity of the Committee's
conclusion.
The second question raised by the Note's language goes to the
validity of that conclusion. After admitting that such evidence "is
untested with respect to the perception, memory, and narration (or
their equivalents) of the actor," the Committee concluded "that
these dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent to assert.",
That conclusion puzzles me. How does "the absence of an intent to
assert" 10 minimize the "dangers" 1 of faulty perception, faulty
memory, or faulty narration "(or their equivalents)"1 2 on the part
"of the actor"? 1 3 To attempt to answer that question, let's take a
classic example 4 of nonverbal conduct "offered as evidence that
7.
8.
9.

FED. R. EvID. 801(a) advisory committee note.
Id.
Id.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. In United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980), the court observed:
The classic case, which is discussed in virtually every textbook on evidence, is Wright
v. Tatham, 7 Adolph. & E. 313, 386, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Ch. 1837), and 5 Cl. &
F. 670, 739, 47 Rev. Rep. 136 (H.L. 1838)....
One of the illustrations advanced in the judicial opinions in Wright v. Tatham is
perhaps even more famous than the case itself. This is Baron Parke's famous sea
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the person acted as he did because of his belief in the existence of
the condition sought to be proved, from which belief the existence
of the condition may be inferred."15 A sea captain, after inspecting
the vessel, placed his family on board and embarked. Subsequently, the sea captain's conduct is offered in evidence to prove
the seaworthiness of the vessel. Is the evidence relevant for the
purpose stated? Certainly.16 The captain's conduct is equivalent to
an implied assertion by him that the ship was seaworthy. Is the
evidence hearsay? A common law court might have said yes. 7
What made the evidence relevant was the fact that the captain's
conduct was the equivalent of an implied assertion by him that the
ship was seaworthy. Since the evidence is being offered to prove
the truth of the matter impliedly asserted, it is hearsay. The Advisory Committee Note, however, characterizes such evidence as
nonhearsay. The Committee's reason is that, "in the absence of an
intent to assert,"' 8 the "dangers ' 19 arising from the fact that the
evidence "is untested with respect to the perception, memory, and
narration (or their equivalents) of the actor

'2 0

"are minimal."'2'

How does the absence of an intent to assert indicate that the captain's inspection of the vessel (perception) was more careful and
thorough than it would have been had the captain intended to assert that the vessel was seaworthy? How does the absence of an
captain example. Is it hearsay to offer as proof of the seaworthiness of a vessel that
its captain, after thoroughly inspecting it, embarked on an ocean voyage upon it with
his family? The court in Wright v. Tatham held that implied assertions of this kind
were hearsay.
492 F. Supp. at 466.
In Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Ch. 1837), afl'd, 47 Rev. Rep. 136 (H.L.
1838), the court stated:
To the latter class belong the supposed conduct of. . . a deceased captain on a
question of seaworthiness, who, after examining every part of the vessel, embarked in
it with his family; all these, when deliberately considered, are . . . mere instances of
hearsay evidence, mere statements, not on oath, but implied in or vouched by the
actual conduct of persons by whose acts the litigant parties are not to be bound.
112 Eng. Rep. at 516.
15. FED. R. EvID. 801(a) advisory committee note.
16. That conclusion of relevancy would seem to be corroborated by the definition of
relevancy contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See supra note 14.
FED. R. EvID. 801(a) advisory committee note.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1986

Implied Assertions

intent to assert indicate that the captain's memory of what he observed during the inspection was more accurate than it would have
been had the captain intended to assert that the vessel was seaworthy? And how does the absence of an intent to assert indicate that
the implied assertion that the vessel was seaworthy (narrationor
its equivalent) is more precise than it would have been had the
captain intended to assert that the vessel was seaworthy? I don't
know. And the Advisory Committee Note doesn't say. The Note
simply states what the Committee may have believed to be a selfapparent conclusion. Perhaps I'm just too obtuse to perceive the
self-apparent. Or, perhaps, the Committee was unable to state a
satisfactory rationale for its conclusion.
The third question raised by the Note's language also goes to the
validity of the Committee's conclusion. After conceding that "[n]o
class of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrication,"2 the
Note states that "the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with
assertive verbal conduct. The situations giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate questions of sincerity."'23 Well, even I can understand that, if the sea captain never
intended to assert that the vessel was seaworthy, he may not have
been indulging in fabrication or insincerity. But diminishing the
likelihood of fabrication or insincerity does not inherently enhance
the accuracy of the actor's perception, memory, or implied narration, and those three factors are usually critical areas of inquiry on
cross-examination. By characterizing category (3) as nonhearsay,
the Advisory Committee provides for the admissibility of such evidence in the absence of the actor, thus precluding the opportunity
for meaningful cross-examination. Moreover, there is underlying
the Committee's conclusion that, in such circumstances, the likelihood of fabrication or insincerity is diminished, the tacit premise
that conduct alone cannot influence the action of others or the alternative tacit premise that conduct alone cannot be intended to
influence the action of others.2 4 I think that either of those tacit
premises may be faulty. Think of the platoon leader in front of his
men in a combat assault. Rather clearly, his conduct can influence
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. I assume that the sharp distinction drawn by the Advisory Committee between
intended assertions and unintended assertions, and the unlikelihood of fabrication or insincerity attaching to the latter, in the Committee's view, rests in part on the premise that only
intended assertions can influence the conduct of others, therefore only with intended assertions would the actor have a motive to fabricate or be disingenuous.

746
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his men and may even be intended to influence them. Our ship
captain's conduct may have influenced, indeed, may have been intended to influence, the actions of prospective passengers and
cargo shippers. That influence, even that intended influence, could
exist solely as the result of the captain's conduct. Further, putting
aside such influence on the actions of others, the captain's conduct,
even absent an intent on his part to assert anything, could be
viewed as ambiguous. It's possible that, after inspecting the vessel,
the captain placed his family on board and embarked because, although he had serious doubts about the vessel's seaworthiness, he
feared that he would lose a much needed commission if he acted
otherwise. Neither the possibility of influencing the conduct of
others, intentionally or unintentionally, nor the inherent ambiguity
of the conduct can be explored adequately in the absence of the
actor. Yet, given the Advisory Committee's nonhearsay characterization, the sea captain's conduct would be admissible notwithstanding the unavailability of the captain.
Does all of that mean that I would exclude evidence of the captain's conduct as hearsay if offered to prove that the vessel was
seaworthy? Not necessarily. Let's assume that the court were to
characterize the captain's conduct as being the equivalent of an
implied assertion by him that the vessel was seaworthy. That
would make the evidence clearly relevant for the purpose stated.
Let's assume, too, that for that very reason the court characterizes
the evidence as hearsay: an implied extrajudicial declaration offered to prove the truth of the matter impliedly asserted therein. I
would think that the court might very well fashion an ad hoc exception to the hearsay rule to accommodate the evidence. The unavailability of the captain would demonstrate the necessity for receiving the evidence. The fact that the captain apparently bet his
life and the lives of his family on the seaworthiness of the vessel
would tend to bespeak trustworthiness. And, as a further condition
precedent to admissibility, the court could require proponent to
negate or diminish the likelihood either that the captain's conduct
had been intended to influence the action of others or that the
conduct had been the product of economic necessity, rather than a
firm belief in the seaworthiness of the vessel. Since it is proponent
who wishes to avail himself of the evidence, it would seem more
appropriate to impose that onus on him as a condition precedent
to admissibility, than to impose on opponent the extraordinarily
difficult onus of "impeaching" the credibility of the unavailable
captain. Given the necessity arising from the captain's unavailabil-
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ity and the trustworthiness arising from his conduct, complimented by proponent's diminishing the likelihood of disingenuousness and ulterior motive, I think such an ad hoc hearsay exception
would be entirely appropriate.
Would it be possible under Rule 804(b)(5)? 25 That Rule provides
that
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions [in
804(b)(l)-(4)] but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [shall be admissible], if the court determines that (A) the statement
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission of
26
the statement into evidence.

Of the four preceding hearsay exceptions in Rule 804, the captain's
conduct and implied assertion would seem to bear the closest relationship to 804(b)(3). 27 Of course, the captain's conduct is the reverse side of that coin. By placing himself and his family on board,
the captain bet their lives that the vessel was seaworthy. Were he
wrong in that belief, the lives of all would be in jeopardy. Does
that bespeak "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness ' 28 compared with a statement which is "so far contrary"2 9 to a
declarant's "pecuniary or proprietary interest" 0 or "so far tend[s]
to subject [declarant] to civil or criminal liability," ' or so far tends
"to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless
he believed it to be true"? 82 No statement contrary to a declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest and no statement contrary to his
possible civil litigation posture could place declarant's life in jeop25.
26.
27.

FED. R. EvD. 804(b)(5).
Id.
FED. R. EVD. 804(b)(3):

A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to
render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose
the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Id.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
Id.
Id.
Id.

748

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:741

ardy. Only the most flagrant statement contrary to a declarant's
penal interest could place his life in jeopardy; and even such a flagrant declaration would not place the lives of declarant's family in
jeopardy. It would seem that the captain's conduct and the implied
assertion arising therefrom do possess "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness," 33 still assuming that proponent diminishes the likelihood of disingenuousness or ulterior motive. By
hypothesis, the conduct and implied assertion are being "offered as
evidence of a material fact, '3 4 the seaworthiness of the vessel.
Given the necessity, trustworthiness, and materiality attaching to
the evidence, its admissibility would seem to serve "the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice. '35 The remaining requirement, that "the statement [be] more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts,"3 would seem to
pose the most serious sticking point.
The language of that requirement is somewhat ambiguous on its
face. It could be read as requiring a judicial determination that the
offered evidence was more probative than any other evidence, singly or in toto, which proponent could reasonably procure. That
very demanding reading would require the court to weigh the offered evidence against the totality of proponent's other evidence
on the same point and admit the challenged evidence only if the
court concluded that the challenged evidence was the more probative. Alternatively, it could be read as requiring a judicial determination only that the offered evidence was more probative than any
other evidence concerning the same general circumstances (in our
hypothetical, the condition of the vessel as known by one uniquely
competent to have made such a determination) which proponent
could reasonably procure. That less demanding reading would
seem to point toward admissibility in our hypothetical situation.
Given that apparent ambiguity, recourse to legislative history
would seem appropriate. In explaining the requirement that the
statement be "more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which proponent can procure through reasonable efforts," the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that
"[tihis requirement is intended to insure that only statements
which have high probative value and necessity may qualify for ad33.
34.

35.
36.

FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.

R.
R.
R.
R.

EVID.
EVID.
EVID.
EVID.

804(b)(5).
804(b)(5)(A).
804(b)(5)(C).
804(b)(5)(B).
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mission under the residual exceptions.

37

The Conference Report

"adopt[ed] the Senate amendment." While the language of the
Senate Judiciary Committee does not clearly resolve the ambiguity
of the Rule's language, it tends to suggest the less demanding reading of that language. "High probative value,"3 9 while demanding,
seems less demanding than a higher probative value than all of the
rest of proponent's evidence on the same point. Consequently, I
am inclined to conclude that the captain's conduct and the implied
assertion it generates, even if characterized as hearsay, would be
admissible under Rule 804(b)(5), once proponent diminishes the
likelihood of disingenuousness or ulterior motive.
Why then did the Advisory Committee in its Note to 801(a)
characterize such evidence as nonhearsay? If the evidence probably
would be admissible under 804(b)(5), even if characterized as hearsay, there would seem to be little point in devoting the major part
of the Note to 801(a) to "proving" that such evidence was nonhearsay. Frankly, I don't know the answer. There are, I think, several
possible explanations. First, the Advisory Committee may have
been attempting to spare the courts the chore of determining
whether such evidence should be treated as an exception to the
hearsay rule under 804(b)(5). Characterizing the evidence as
nonhearsay would, indeed, eliminate that judicial task. Second, the
Advisory Committee may have felt strongly that such evidence
should be characterized as nonhearsay and be admissible, whether
or not covered by 804(b)(5); therefore, the Committee so characterized it. The third possible reason is a bit less obvious.
In its preliminary form, Rule 804(a) read:
8

General Provisions. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its
nature and the special circumstances under which it was made offer strong
assurances of accuracy and the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 0

In its preliminary form, Rule 804(b) read:
Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation,
the following are examples of statements conforming with the requirements
37.

S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprintedin 1974 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD.

NEWS 7051, 7066.
38. COMM. OF CONy. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, 7106.
39. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7051, 7066.

40. Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts & Magistrates
PRoP. R. EvID. 804(a) (Prelim. Draft 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) (hereinafter
cited as PROP. R. EVID., with reference to a specific rule).

Vol. 24:741
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of this rule .

4

There then followed five such "examples.

42

Congress rejected the proposed Rule. The House Judiciary Committee "deleted [the provision] as injecting 'too much uncertainty'
into the law of evidence and impairing the ability of practitioners
to prepare for trial."' The Senate Judiciary Committee, too, discarded the "example only" rule and supplanted it with the current
"residual exception." The Conference Committee "adopt[ed] the
Senate amendment."" Thus, the Advisory Committee's original
concept that trial courts were to have broad discretion in fashioning hearsay exceptions, guided by an "illustrative only" rule, was
replaced by a series of specific hearsay exceptions and a limited
residual exception.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801(a) existed in its present form in the preliminary draft of the proposed rules. 45 It was

fashioned by the Committee at a time when the Committee contemplated that the federal courts would have broad discretion to
fashion a hearsay exception for any statement "if its nature and
the special circumstances under which it was made offer[ed] strong
assurances of accuracy and the declarant [was] unavailable as a
witness.'

46

Of course, after Congress dramatically amended Rule

804 (as well as a number of the other proposed rules), the Advisory
Committee had the opportunity to amend its notes to bring them
into conformity with the congressional amendments. Sometimes
the notes were assiduously amended by the Advisory Committee;
sometimes they were not. 7 Consequently, it's impossible to deter41. PROP. R. EviD. 804(b) (emphasis added).
42. The examples were (1) former testimony, (2) statement of recent perception, (3)
statement under belief of impending death, (4) statement against interest, and (5) statement of personal or family history. PROP. R. EVID. 804(b).
43. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7051, 7065.
44. COMM. OF CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 7098, 7105..
45. PROP. R. EvID. 801(a) advisory committee note.
46. PROP. R. EviD. 804(a).
47. E.g., the Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Evid. 607, which provides that
"[tihe credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
him," states in part: "if the impeachment is by a prior statement, it is free from hearsay
dangers and is excluded from the category of hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)." FED. R. EvID.
607 advisory committee note (emphasis added). Although under PROP. R. EvID. 801(c)(2) all
inconsistent statements of a witness were characterized as nonhearsay, the rule ultimately
enacted by Congress treats as nonhearsay only those prior inconsistent statements which
were "given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding, or in a deposition . . ." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
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mine to a certainty if the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801(a),
The Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 601 (emphasis added), which provides
that:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provide in these rules.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision the competency of a
witness shall be determined in accordance with state law,
reads in part: "The Dead Man's Acts are surviving traces of the common law disqualification of parties and interested persons. They exist in variety too great to convey conviction of
their wisdom and effectiveness. These rules contain no provision of this kind." FED. R. EVID.
601 advisory committee note. That language in the Note was drafted when PROP. R. EvD.
601 provided in toto that "[elvery person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules," with the intention that the Federal Rules of Evidence would govern all issues of competency in state law claims as well as in federal causes of action. Once
the congressional decision was made that state law should determine competency in regard
to state law claims or defenses (including the state's Dead Man's Act, if one exists), the
Advisory Committee Note's reference to the undesirability of Dead Man's Acts became
largely superfluous and perhaps even misleading. Its only applicability today would be to
federal causes of action, where, clearly, a Dead Man's Act is to have no applicability.
Longoria v. Wilson, 730 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1984).
PROP. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), dealing with the admissibility of former testimony, permitted the
receipt of such evidence in a subsequent civil action against a party who had not been a
litigant in the earlier action so long as there existed a similar opportunity, motive, and interest to develop the testimony as between earlier litigant and present litigant. There was no
requirement that the earlier litigant be a predecessor in interest to the present litigant. The
Advisory Committee Note to that proposed rule noted a change from the common law requirement of "privity" between earlier litigant and present litigant. PROP. R. EvID. 804(b)(1)
advisory committee note. In enacting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), Congress explicitly required
that the earlier litigant be "a predecessor in interest" to the subsequent litigant. That requirement grew out of the conclusion of the House Judiciary Committee that:
it is generally unfair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is
being offered responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled by another party. The sole exception to this. . . is when a party's predecessor in
interest in a civil action or proceeding had an opportunity and similar motive to examine the witness. The Committee amended the Rule to reflect these policy
determinations.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973). The Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) was amended to read in part: "The question
remains whether strict identity, or privity, should continue as a requirement with respect to
the party against whom offered." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee note. It seems
to me that the language of the amended Note suggests a grudging reluctance to acquiesce in
a congressional determination different from the Committee's original preference. But cf.
Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969
(1978) (giving the phrase "predecessor in interest" an interpretation so broad as to make it
nearly synonymous with any prior party having a similar motive and interest in examining
the now unavailable witness), and Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 1295
(6th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e adopt the position taken by the Lloyd court ....
"). However,
"[tihus far most courts-the Lloyd majority [opinion] being the exception-have attempted
to make the term ["predecessor in interest"] mean something more than the similar motive
approach rejected by the Congress." E. EPSTEIN, G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EMERGING
PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 302-03 (1983). See Seidelson, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the DiscriminatingSelection of Forum, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 558, 582
(1985).
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left intact after the dramatic congressional changes in Rule 804,
indicates a decision by the Committee that no change in its Note
to 801(a) was required by the congressional amendments to 804.
Well, what's the significance of all that legislative and pre-legislative history? To me, it suggests some uncertainty with regard to
the significance to be attached to the Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 801(a). Bearing in mind that the Note was written when the
Advisory Committee contemplated that the federal courts would
have broad discretion in fashioning ad hoc hearsay exceptions, two
disparate conclusions suggest themselves. First, the Committee's
decision to characterize nonassertive nonverbal conduct as
nonhearsay could take on an a fortiori significance. If the Committee saw fit to fashion that nonhearsay characterization, notwithstanding the contemplated broad judicial discretion to fashion
hearsay exceptions, the Committee must have felt very strongly
about the urgent propriety of imposing the nonhearsay characterization.4 Alternatively, the Committee, contemplating that broad
judicial discretion to fashiorr hearsay exceptions, may have felt
that it would, therefore, be no "big deal" to characterize nonassertive nonverbal conduct as nonhearsay; after all, the courts probaThe Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EvID. 803(18), the learned treatise exception to
the hearsay rule, reads: "Moreover, the rule avoids the unreality of admitting evidence for
the purpose of impeachment only, with an instruction to the jury not to consider it otherwise. The parallel to the treatment of prior inconsistent statements will be apparent. See
Rules 613(b) and 801(d)(1)." FED. R. EvID. 803(18) advisory committee note (emphasis
added). As was noted earlier on in this note in connection with the Advisory Committee
Note to FED. R. EvID. 607, Rule 801(d)(1) requires as a condition precedent to substantive
admissibility that the prior inconsistent statement have been "given under oath subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition . . ." FED.
R. EvID. 613(b), dealing with extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness, makes no reference to the substantive admissibility of such a statement. Apparently,
in drafting the Note to FED. R. Evm. 803(18), the Advisory Committee's "parallel" between
that Rule and Rules 613(b) and 801(d)(1) rested on the language of PROP. R. EvID.
801(c)(2)(i) which was significantly amended by Congress in FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
48. This alternative explanation finds some support in the Rule and in the Advisory
Committee Note. Under the language of the Rule, "nonverbal conduct of a person" is a
"statement" only "if it is intended by him as an assertion." FED. R. EvID. 801(a)(2). Under
the language of the Note:
When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory that it is not hearsay, a preliminary determination will be required to determine whether an assertion is intended.
The rule is so worded as to place the burden upon the party claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases will be resolved against him and in favor
of admissibility.
FED. R. Evm. 801(a) advisory committee note. That placing of the burden on opponent
rather than on proponent implies a strong urge on the part of the Committee to achieve the
nonhearsay characterization. For a discussion of the limited scope of the language excerpted
from the Rule and the Note, see infra notes 86, 89 and 91 and accompanying text.
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bly would receive such evidence as an ad hoc exception anyway.
Which is the more likely explanation? I don't know.
There are, however, two things I do know. First, the Committee's
rationale for its characterization of nonassertive nonverbal conduct
as nonhearsay is, as already noted, not very persuasive. Second,
however, that characterization seems compelled by the explicit language of Rule 801(a) in defining a "statement"'4 9 as "(1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion."5 ° The sea captain's conduct involved neither an oral nor a written assertion. Moreover, his conduct, let us assume, was not intended by him as an assertion.
Therefore, the conduct was not a "statement." Since 801(c)'s definition of hearsay requires a "statement," the sea captain's conduct
was not hearsay. Consequently, despite my own discomfiture over
the Advisory Committee Note's rationale for that conclusion, and
despite the absence of any legislative history indicating such a congressional intent,5 I feel compelled to conclude from the language
of Rule 801(a) and (c) that the sea captain's conduct is not hearsay. Put category (3), nonverbal conduct not intended to be assertive, in the nonhearsay column. But do recall the weaknesses in the
Committee's rationale for that conclusion; those same weaknesses
(as well as some others) seem to exist with regard to the Committee's treatment of category (5). 51 And with category (5), I do not
believe the language of the Rule compels the Advisory Committee's
conclusion.
4.

Nonassertive Verbal Conduct

With regard to nonassertive verbal conduct, and category (5), assertive verbal conduct, the Advisory Committee Note is considerably more succinct: "Similar considerations govern nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a
basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted, also
excluded from the definition of hearsay by the language of subdivi49. FED.R. EVID. 801(a).
50. Id.
51. Neither the House nor Senate Judiciary Committee Report makes any reference to
the meaning to be attributed to the language of FED. R. EvID. 801(a) or (c). The House
Report contains comments on Rule 801 commencing with 801(d)(1). H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7076, and the
Senate Report contains comments on Rule 801 commencing with 801(d)(1)(A). S. REP. No.
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7062.
52. See infra text accompanying note 54.
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sion (c). ' ' 53 What constitutes an example of category (4)? Declarant, believing himself to be alone, hears a radio or television news
bulletin which elicits from him a surprised, "Son-of-a-gun!" Subsequently, a witness offers to testify to declarant's surprised exclamation as evidence that declarant had no previous knowledge of
the matter reported in the bulletin. Opposing counsel's hearsay objection would be overruled. Although declarant's reaction had been
verbal, that verbalization had not been intended as an assertion of
anything to anyone. Or, declarant, believing himself to be alone,
sobs, "I don't want to live to see another day." Subsequently, a
witness offers to testify to declarant's mournful utterance as a
means of proving that declarant then had a mind bent on suicide.
Opposing counsel's hearsay objection would be overruled. Again,
although declarant's conduct had been verbal, that verbalization
had not been intended as an assertion of anything to anyone.
Neither of those examples of category (4), nor the Committee's
characterization of them as nonhearsay, gives me any difficulty.
Put category (4), nonassertive verbal conduct, in the nonhearsay
column.
5.

Assertive Verbal Conduct

Assertive verbal conduct, and the Advisory Committee's characterization of it as nonhearsay presents me with great difficulties.
Let's begin by using the Committee's description of category (5)
verbatim: "verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis
for inferring something other than the matter asserted. ' 54 Perhaps
the best known example of category (5) occurred in Wright v. Tatham.5" Testator, Marsden, left his estate to Wright, a former employee. Testator's heir at law, Admiral Tatham, challenged the
will, asserting that Marsden had lacked testamentary capacity.
Counsel for Wright offered in evidence six letters which had been
written to Marsden. Two of the letters were from a "some time
solicitor to Mr. Marsden before 1789, when the letters were supposed to have been written."5' 6 Those letters requested that Mars53. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee note.
54. Id.
55. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Ch. 1837), aff'd, 47 Rev. Rep. 136 (H.L. 1838).
56. 112 Eng. Rep. at 491. Of the six letters considered by the Exchequer Chamber,
only three were considered by the House of Lords: the letter from Charles Tatham, the
letter from the Vicar of Lancaster, and the letter from the Rev. Henry Ellershaw. 47 Rev.
Rep. at 138-39, 141, 142. The tortuous litigation history of Wright v. Tatham is set out at 47
Rev. Rep. at 136-37.
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den attend a meeting for the purpose of determining a common
position to be taken at a "Public Meeting. '57 One of the letters was
from the "Vicar of Lancaster ' 58 suggesting that a "[c]ase should be
settled . . .and laid before Councill to whose opinion both sides

should submit

. .

.

.

59

Another letter, from "Mr. Bickersmith,

Surgeon,"60 requested Marsden, in his role of "Trustee,"'" to attend and provide support for a "Mr. Dobson ' 6 2 at a meeting. The
fifth letter was from "the Rev. Henry Ellershaw,"'6 s who, upon his
resignation from "the perpetual curacy of Hornby," 4 expressed his
gratitude to Marsden who "had appointed him."'6 5 The sixth letter
was from "Charles Tatham, Mr. Marsden's cousin. "66 It recounted
the writer's trip to "the Cape of Verginia, "67 the "Most Shocking
Condition the People dieing from 5 to 10 per day,"6 8 and the
writer's anticipated travel to Philadelphia. The authors of the letters were dead at the time of trial. Each, presumably, had known
Marsden well enough to have formed some opinion of his mental
capacity.
Let's begin with competence. Had each of the authors been
available as a witness, each would have been competent to offer an
opinion as to Marsden's mental capacity. Federal Rule of Evidence
701 would suggest a similar result; it permits a lay witness to offer
an opinion which is "rationally based on the perception of the witness and . . . helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or
the determination of a fact in issue."' 9 How about relevancy? Obviously, the testimony of each such witness as to Marsden's mental
capacity would have been relevant. But what made the letters relevant? I guess each letter was equivalent to an implied assertion by
its author that Marsden was mentally competent. Then weren't the
letters hearsay, that is, wasn't each letter an extrajudicial declaration offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter impliedly
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

112 Eng. Rep. at 492.
Id. at 491.

Id.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 491.

64. Id.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

Id.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 701.
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asserted therein? Ultimately, the House of Lords said yes. 70 Apparently, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801(a) says no. Why
the change?
The Note states that "similar considerations" 71 apply to "verbal
conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted," 72 category (5), as applied to
"nonverbal conduct, '7 3 category (3). Those considerations were
that (1) the "dangers '74 of "untested . . . perception, memory, and
narration (or their equivalents) of the actor"' 7 1 were "minimal in
76 and (2) the "likelihood 77 of
the absence of an intent to assert,
"fabrication 7 8 "is less"' 79 and "questions of sincerity"80 are "virtually . . . eliminate[d]" 81 "in the absence of an intent to assert."82
Do those "considerations" apply to the letters in Wright? Each author made an implied assertion that Marsden was mentally competent. How would the perception of each author have been adversely affected had he intended to assert that Marsden was
competent? Presumably, with or without an intent to so assert,
each author's knowledge of and familiarity with Marsden and his
mental condition would have been precisely the same. How would
memory of each author have been adversely affected had he intended to assert that Marsden was competent? Presumably, with
or without an intent to so assert, each author's memory of his perceptions would have been precisely the same. How would the narration (or its equivalent) of each author have been adversely affected had he intended to assert that Marsden was competent?
Assuming that each letter was written ante litem motam, as seems
to have been the case, presumably the implied assertion that Marsden was competent would have been no more precise than it would
have been had the author intended to assert the same conclusion.
In fact, an intention to assert that conclusion, or an explicit assertion of that conclusion, would, if anything, tend to strengthen the
70.
71.
72.
73.

47 Rev. Rep. 136 (H.L. 1838).
FED.

Id.
Id.

74.

Id.
Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
75.

78.

Id.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.

R.

EvID.

801(a) advisory committee note.
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precision of the narration.
How about fabrication and sincerity? Since the letters were
written ante litem motam, there would appear to be little likelihood that the authors were fabricating or being insincere. Such
disingenuousness is possible, of course. It's possible that each author, believing Marsden to be incompetent, wrote as he did in a
desire to act kindly toward one lacking mental capacity. How
would that possibility of disingenuousness be enhanced if each author had explicitly expressed his (false) belief that Marsden was
competent? The actual letters, absent such an explicit expression,
clearly connote such a belief by their writers. The desire to act
kindly toward one thought to be incompetent would hardly have
been better served by an explicit assertion that the intended
reader was competent. It would seem that the sincerity of each author would be pretty much the same whether or not each had intended to assert a belief in Marsden's competence.
In sum, perception, memory, narration "(or their equivalents)" 83
and sincerity on the part of the declarants would appear to be of
the same level with or without an intention to assert. Certainly, the
absence of such an intention had no significant beneficial effect on
any of those factors. The distinction drawn by the Advisory Committee Note between the level of each of those factors absent an
intention to assert and with an intention to assert simply doesn't
hold up. Since that asserted distinction is the principal reason for
the Committee's characterization of category (5), "verbal conduct
which is assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something
other than the matter asserted, ' ' " as nonhearsay, the characterization becomes suspect.
With category (3), nonverbal conduct, although I found the rationale for the Committee's nonhearsay characterization questionable, I felt impelled to accept its conclusion because that conclusion
was compelled by the language of the Rule: "A 'statement' is (1) an
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it
is intended by him as an assertion." 8 5 Since, by hypothesis, the
nonverbal conduct of the sea captain involved no assertion, it did
not constitute a "statement," therefore, under the Rule could not
be hearsay.
Is the same true of the Committee's characterization of category
83.
84.
85.

Id.

Id.
FED. R. EvID. 801(a).
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(5) (and the letters in Wright) as nonhearsay? I think not. Here,
by definition, we are dealing with "verbal conduct which is assertive." 86 Consequently, category (5) could easily satisfy the Rule's
requirement that a statement be an oral or written assertion.
Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history of the Rule to
indicate that Congress affirmatively acquiesced in the Advisory
Committee's conclusion that category (5) should be treated as
nonhearsay8 7 With regard to category (5), the Advisory Committee's conclusion must stand or fall on its own merits. As we have
seen, the principal reason for that conclusion is suspect.
I feel compelled to reveal to the reader a personal bias that may
well have influenced my own adverse reaction to the Committee's
conclusion and to the suspect rationale for that conclusion. I believe rather strongly in the efficacy of cross-examination. Consequently, I am not inclined to embrace quickly a relatively new category of nonhearsay with its concomitant effect of receiving
extrajudicial declarations absent any meaningful opportunity to
cross-examine the declarants. It's true that I am inclined to believe
that most of us attempt to be honest and accurate in most of our
extrajudicial declarations. It's also true that I believe that the honesty and accuracy of the declarant will be approximately the same
whether or not he had the intention to assert. But those two beliefs
combined do not destroy the possible efficacy of cross-examination.
Even the most honest declarant may have been unaware of some
fact that would have changed the nature of his declaration. Even
the most honest declarant may have been unaware of some subconscious influence that may have colored his declaration. And even
the most honest declarant, even lacking the specific intention to
assert fact A, made aware of some unknown to him fact or some
unrealized subconscious influence, may have been unlikely to assert fact B, from which the existence of A could be inferred. Finally, and sadly, though it does, I believe, tend to be the exception
and not the rule, not every declarant in every case will have at86. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee note. After all, each of the written declarations in Wright asserted something. Just what the Advisory Committee may have intended by that quoted phrase, and whether that intention is corroborated by the language
of the Rule itself, is discussed in the text following note 88 infra, at note 89 infra, note 91
infra, and following note 93 infra. It should be emphasized that the Advisory Committee,
itself, described category (5) as "verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for
inferring something other than the matter asserted. . ." FED. R. EVID.801 advisory committee note (emphasis added). That language of the Committee strongly implies that category
(5) consists of "an oral or written assertion." FED. R. EvID. 801(a) (emphasis added).
87. See supra note 51.
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tempted to be as honest and accurate as possible in making his
extrajudicial declaration. Those shortcomings, ignorance of a significant fact, unawareness of a subconscious influence, and, occasionally, disingenuousness, are the very things cross-examination is
intended to reveal. Because each of those shortcomings may exist
with regard to any extrajudicial declaration, irrespective of the declarant's intention or lack of intention to assert a specific fact, I
think the Committee's apparent conclusion that verbal conduct
which is impliedly assertive should be treated as nonhearsay is
unfortunate.
That conclusion is unfortunate for another reason, I believe. The
conclusion itself is somewhat ambiguous. The Committee defines
category (5) as "verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a
basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted."88
Do those italicized words mean something other than the matter
explicitly asserted or something other than the matter explicitly or
impliedly asserted? If the first interpretation is accepted, the language marks a very dramatic change from pre-existing law; that
interpretation would lead to the conclusion that an extrajudicial
declaration offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
impliedly asserted therein was not hearsay. It's difficult (at least
for me) to imagine that, in enacting Rule 801(a) and (c), Congress
intended to effect such a dramatic change in evidence law when
the change is not clearly reflected in the language of the Rule, is
nowhere reflected in the legislative history of the Rule, and, therefore, rests exclusively on the second half of a single sentence in the
Advisory Committee Note. If the second interpretation is accepted,
the extrajudicial declaration would be nonhearsay only if the fact
to be inferred therefrom was clearly different from the fact explicitly or impliedly asserted therein. While that interpretation would
effect a considerably less dramatic change in evidence law, thus
straining credulity less because the change rested only on a halfsentence in the Advisory Committee Note, it would impose on the
courts an ongoing difficult task: determining if the disparity between the fact to be inferred and the fact explicitly or impliedly
asserted was sufficiently great to justify characterizing the declaration as nonhearsay. And as the disparity between the fact to be
inferred and the fact explicitly or impliedly asserted becomes
greater, the relevancy of the declaration is likely to become more
remote. Consequently, neither interpretation of those italicized
88.

FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee note (emphasis added).
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words in that half-sentence is without difficulty.
Let's try each interpretation in a hypothetical setting. A wrongful death action is brought against defendant Dean. His car struck
and killed plaintiff's decedent. The theory of liability asserted is
that defendant was driving his car while intoxicated. In his case-inchief, plaintiff presents evidence that, prior to the fatal impact, defendant had been at a party, booze was served at the party and
defendant had ingested some of the booze. In addition, plaintiff
presents evidence that Dean had driven Jones to the party. Then
plaintiff calls Williams to the stand. Williams offers to testify that,
shortly before Dean left the party, Dean said to Williams, "Tell
Jones I'm ready to leave and I'll drive him home." When Williams
gave Jones the message, Jones replied, "I'd rather walk home than
ride with anyone as drunk as Dean." Opposing counsel's hearsay
objection is almost certain to be sustained. Williams is offering to
testify to Jones' extrajudicial declaration for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted therein, i.e., Dean was too
drunk to drive. A fairly straightforward instance of category (1):
"verbal assertions." But suppose Williams offers to testify that
Jones' response was, "I'd rather crawl home on my hands and
knees." Is that extrajudicial declaration hearsay?
Let's examine a preliminary matter. Suppose that defendant's
counsel objects to the offered testimony as being irrelevant. Plaintiff's counsel is almost certain to argue that Jones' declaration was
an implied assertion that Dean was too drunk to drive, and is
therefore relevant. Let's assume that the court would agree with
plaintiff's counsel and overrule defendant's irrelevancy objection.
Then defendant objects to the offered testimony as hearsay. How
should the court rule?
If the first and more dramatic interpretation of the half-sentence
in the Advisory Committee Note were accepted, the court might
overrule the objection. After all, the extrajudicial declaration isn't
being offered to prove the truth of the matter explicitly asserted
therein, "I'd rather crawl home on my hands and knees"; it's being
offered to prove the truth of the matter impliedly asserted therein,
Dean was too drunk to drive. It would be a little bit troubling (at
least to me) that the very implied assertion that made the declaration relevant would simultaneously make the declaration nonhearsay because the assertion was "only" implied. On the other hand, if
the second interpretation of that half-sentence were accepted, the
court might sustain the hearsay objection. There is no significant
disparity between (1) the matter explicitly and impliedly asserted
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in the declaration and (2) the fact sought to be proved. The inference sought to be proved is precisely the same as the matter impliedly asserted in the extrajudicial declaration: Dean was too
drunk to drive. What's a poor judge to do?
Well, the Advisory Committee Note does say: "[t]he effect of the
definition of 'statement' is to exclude from the operation of the
hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an assertion. The key to the definition is that nothing is
an assertion unless intended to be one."8' 9 Let's use that magic
"key." Did Jones intend his declaration to be an assertion? Certainly he intended to assert to Williams that he (Jones) did not
want to ride with Dean. But did Jones mean to assert to Williams
that Dean was drunk? I don't know. I'm not sure that Jones would
know, were he available. Most of us are rather thoughtless of the
legal nuances of most of our extrajudicial declarations. How is the
court to make that determination? I suppose the court could reason that, given the rather dramatic nature of the response ("I'd
rather crawl home on my hands and knees"), Jones did intend to
assert impliedly that Dean was drunk. If the court did so conclude,
presumably it would sustain defendant's hearsay objection. And
presumably the court would so react irrespective of the ambiguity
of the Note's half-sentence. Whether that language is read as referring to verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for
inferring something other than the matter explicitly asserted (the
more dramatic reading), or as referring to verbal conduct which is
assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than
the matter explicitly or impliedly asserted (the less dramatic reading), the Note itself says that "[t]he key to the definition is that
nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one."90 Consequently,
should the court conclude that Jones had intended to assert even
impliedly that Dean was drunk, the Note's "key to the definition"
would indicate that Jones' extrajudicial declaration was hearsay.
Let's tinker with Jones' response. Suppose he had said to Williams, "Tell Dean 'no thanks.' I'll call a cab," and that he did immediately phone for a cab. Suppose, too, that defendant objects to
Williams' offered testimony of Jones' declaration and conduct as
being irrelevant. Plaintiff's counsel argues to the court that Jones'
declaration and conduct constituted an implied assertion that
Dean was drunk. I suspect the court would be inclined toward the
89.
90.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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conclusion that this less emphatic response was not even an implied assertion that Dean was drunk, and would, therefore, be inclined to sustain defendant's objection that the evidence was irrelevant. But suppose that plaintiff's counsel enlarged his offer of
proof by asserting to the court that other evidence would indicate
that the cab fare from the site of the party to Jones' home was
forty-five dollars. Doesn't that make Jones' response at least as
emphatic as "I'd rather crawl home on my hands and knees"?
That latter declaration is more rhetoric than fact, but forty-five
dollars is forty-five dollars. Assuming that the "cab" response is as
emphatic as the "crawl" response, the court could conclude that
the former, as well as the latter, was intended as an implied assertion that Dean was drunk. In that case, the court might overrule
defendant's irrelevancy objection, in which case, defendant would
certainly raise the hearsay objection. How should the court rule?
If the court embraced the more dramatic interpretation of the
half-sentence in the Advisory Committee Note, the court might be
inclined to overrule defendant's objection. The fact that the relevant declaration and conduct constituted merely am implied assertion of Dean's intoxication would seem to point toward that result.
And again we would be confronted with the anomaly that the very
implied assertion that made the declaration and conduct relevant
would compel the judicial determination that the declaration and
conduct were not hearsay. If the court embraced the less dramatic
interpretation of the language in the Advisory Committee Note,
the court would ask if there was a significant disparity between the
fact sought to be proved (Dean's intoxication) and the matter explicitly and impliedly asserted in the declaration and conduct.
Since the matter impliedly asserted (the very matter that made the
declaration and conduct relevant), is precisely the same as the fact
sought to be proved, no such disparity would exist and the court
would be inclined to sustain defendant's hearsay objection.
But before converting inclination into decision, the court should
apply the Advisory Committee Note's magic "key": When Jones
made the "cab" declaration and, in fact, called a cab, did Jones
intend his declaration and conduct to be an assertion? Certainly
Jones intended to assert that he did not want to ride with Dean.
But did Jones intend to assert that Dean was drunk? I still don't
know. I'm still not sure that Jones would know, were he available.
But the court, using the magic "key," would be required to answer
that question, and its answer would be critical to admissibility. I
suppose the court might reason that, if Jones were sufficiently mo-
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tivated to pay forty-five dollars for a cab ride home rather than
ride with Dean, Jones did intend to assert impliedly that Dean was
drunk. In that case, the court might sustain defendant's objection.
Suppose, however, that at side-bar counsel for the plaintiff says to
the court that, notwithstanding Jones' strong motivation, the court
cannot rationally conclude that the basis of that motivation was
Dean's alleged intoxication. After all, when Dean drove Jones to
the party, Dean may (unknowingly) have done or said something
that so offended Jones that he would not again ride with Dean. Or,
after the two arrived at the party, Dean (unknowingly) may have
done or said something that so offended Jones that he would not
again ride with Dean. Given Jones' unavailability, how is the court
to determine the real basis for Jones' motivation for taking an expensive cab ride home and, therefore, his likely intention in saying
and doing what he did? And if the court cannot do so, doesn't that
make the court's determination of whether to sustain or overrule
defendant's objection a practical impossibility? And does it not
also suggest that the court's earlier determination of relevancy,
based on the emphatic motive of Jones' response, may have lacked
a rational basis? In fact, the very side-bar assertions made by
plaintiff's counsel in an effort to persuade the court that declarant
had not intended to assert that defendant was drunk, cast significant doubt on the relevancy of the extrajudicial declaration and
conduct. And just to make the apparent disorder complete,
wouldn't each of those assertions be equally applicable to the
court's earlier rulings on relevancy and hearsay with regard to the
"crawl" declaration?
The Advisory Committee Note purports to offer a solution to
these problems. The Note provides:
When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory that it is not a statement, and hence not hearsay, a preliminary determination will be required
to determine whether an assertion is intended. The rule is so worded as to
place the burden upon the party claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases will be resolved against him and in favor of admissibility. The determination involves no greater difficulty than many other
preliminary questions of fact."

How is "[t]he rule. . . so worded as to place the burden upon the
party claiming that the intention [to assert] existed"? 2 Rule
801(a) reads: "A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or
91. Id.
92. Id.
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(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion.9 3 Do those italicized words, following and clearly modifying (2), modify (1) as well? Generally, the rule of grammar is
that a pronoun refers to the last antecedent noun, and that grammatical rule is especially critical where the possibility of confusion
exists in the interpretation of a statute.9 4 Under that general rule,
"it" in the italicized phrase would refer to "nonverbal conduct,"
not to "an oral or written assertion." That grammatical conclusion
would seem to be corroborated by the fact that the two prior nouns
are separately numbered as (1) and (2). Moreover, had Congress
intended the italicized phrase to modify (1) as well as (2), Congress
easily could have stated: "if either is intended by him as an assertion." Consequently, I am inclined to read the phrase actually used
by Congress as referring to "nonverbal conduct" only and not to
"an oral or written assertion." As a result, I don't think the "rule is
so worded as to place the burden upon the party claiming that the
intention existed" 5 with regard to the problem we are considering:
an extrajudicial declaration which consists of an oral assertion.
93. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (emphasis added).
94. Davis v. Gibbs, 39 Wash. 2d 481, 236 P.2d 545 (1951). "Where no contrary intention appears in a statute, relative and qualifying words and phrases, both grammatically and
legally, refer to the last antecedent. . . . The last antecedent is the last word which can be
made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence.
... Id. at 482, 236
P.2d at 546 (citations omitted).
2[A] N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.33 (4th ed. 1984):
Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears,
refer solely to the last antecedent. The last antecedent is "the last word, phrase, or
clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of a sentence."
Thus a proviso usually is construed to apply to the provision or clause immediately
preceding it.
Id. at 245 (footnotes omitted).
E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 196 (1940). "[I]n case of doubt, the rules
of grammar may justify the acceptance of a particular construction. And besides, such rules
may also operate to corroborate a certain construction and thereby confirm it as the intent
of the legislature, especially where the statute seems to be carefully constructed grammatically." Id. at 338 (footnotes omitted).
L. SQUIRES & M. ROMBAUER, LEGAL WRITING IN A NUTSHELL (1982). "The use of 'it' in legal
writing causes more confusion than any other pronoun reference." Id. at 231.
G. PECK, WRITING PERSUASIVE BRIEFS (1984). "Pronouns are necessary as a means of
avoiding wearisome repetition, but they also invite awkwardness and error. The person or
thing to which a pronoun refers must be clear, otherwise the pronoun will become a major
source of ambiguity." Id. at 28.
R. DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (1965). "Another common form of
ambiguity is uncertainty of pronominal reference. Much of this can be avoided by putting
the pronoun as close as possible to the word or phrase to which it refers, making certain that
the two agree in number." Id. at 74.
95. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee note (emphasis added).
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Perhaps not surprisingly, I find the Advisory Committee's "solution" a bit ambiguous for a couple of other reasons. Is "evidence of
conduct" intended to refer only to category (3), nonverbal conduct,
or is it intended to refer as well to category (5), verbal conduct, the
matter at issue here? Does the phrase "whether an assertion is intended" refer only to the intention to make an explicit assertion of
the matter sought to be proved, or does it refer as well to the intention to make an implied assertion of the matter sought to be
proved? In order to give the Advisory Committee's "solution" at
least potential applicability to category (5) and the problem we are
considering, let's assume that the committee intended the broader
application of both phrases. Then, applying the "solution" to the
"cab" and "crawl" declarations, the court would assume that
neither declaration had been made with the intention, explicit or
implied, of asserting that Dean was intoxicated, unless and until
defense counsel meets the burden of persuading the court to the
contrary. Let's assume, too, that defense counsel candidly concedes
that he has no idea of the unavailable Jones' intention at the time
he made the declaration. In those circumstances, the Committee's
solution would point toward a nonhearsay characterization and admission of the declaration.
Does that solution, in fact, "involve no greater difficulty than
many other preliminary questions of fact"?" I'm inclined to think
otherwise. In these circumstances, the very same considerations
(including the solution's assumption) that point toward the conclusion that Jones had not intended to assert, explicitly or impliedly,
that Dean was intoxicated, simultaneously point toward a lack of
relevancy of the declaration. The strain between the assumption of
a lack of intention to assert anything with regard to Dean's condition, the condition precedent to a nonhearsay characterization and
admissibility, and the relevancy of the declaration to evidence
Dean's condition is apparent and inherent.
In view of (1) the dubiousness of the Advisory Committee's conclusions that the absence of an intention to assert somehow enhances the declarant's perception, memory and narration "(or their
equivalents)"; (2) the fact that the Rule does not expressly exclude
from the definition of hearsay verbal conduct which is assertive,
but offered to prove something other than the matter asserted; (3)
the fact that the legislative history of the Rule offers no evidence
of a congressional intent to exclude such assertions from the defi96.

FED.

R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee note.
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nition of hearsay; and (4) the fact that the Committee's solution
creates an inherent strain between the nonhearsay characterization
and the relevancy of the extrajudicial declaration; I believe the
federal courts should not read Rule 801(a) and (c) as excluding
from the definition of hearsay such assertive verbal conduct.
How have the federal courts reacted to such extrajudicial declarations? In United States v. Zenni,9 7 the court's opinion begins
with these words: "This prosecution for illegal bookmaking activities presents a classic problem in the law of evidence, namely,
whether implied assertions are hearsay."" The court, relying on
Rule 801(a) and (c) and the Advisory Committee Note thereto,9 9
concluded that implied assertions were no longer hearsay.1 00 These
were the facts of Zenni:
While conducting a search of the premises of [one of] the defendant[s] . . .
pursuant to a lawful search warrant which authorized a search for evidence
of bookmaking activities, government agents answered the telephone several
times. The unknown callers stated directions for the placing of bets on various sporting events. The government proposes to introduce this evidence to
show that the callers believed that the premises were used in betting operations. The existence of such belief tends to prove that they were so used.
The defendants object on the ground of hearsay.' 0 '

The court offered this (real or hypothetical) example of the extrajudicial declarations: "Put $2 to win on Paul Revere in the third at
Pimlico. ' ' 10 2 The court characterized that "utterance"0° as "a direction and not an assertion of any kind, and therefore [it] can be
neither true nor false. 1' 04 Surely, that declaration is an assertion of
declarant's belief that (1) a horse named Paul Revere (2) is entered
in the third race (3) at Pimlico (4) on (or after) the day of the call.
Were the declaration offered to prove the existence of any of those
facts, it would almost certainly be characterized as hearsay, and,
almost as certainly, be excluded.1 05 Why? Because cross-examina97. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
98. Id. at 465.
99. Id. at 468-69.
100. Id. at 469.
101. Id. at 465.
102. Id. at 466 n.7.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. FED. R. Evm. 803(3) defines and limits the state of mind exception to the hearsay
rule as follows: "A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind ... but not
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed ......
While each of us may be the world's foremost authority as to our own present state of mind,
each of us can be mistaken as to those facts remembered or believed which contribute to our
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tion of the declarant, were he available as a witness, could reveal
that declarant was mistaken as to any one or all of the matters
impliedly asserted by him. Consequently, the court cannot have
been correct in concluding that the extrajudicial declaration was
"not an assertion of any kind" 10 or that implied assertions are not
hearsay under Rule 801(a) and (c) and the Advisory Committee
Note thereto.
Of course, in Zenni, the extrajudicial declaration was not offered
to prove any of the four numbered facts in the preceding paragraph. Rather, it and the other similar extrajudicial declarations
were offered to prove that the anticipated auditor was a bookmaker. What made those extrajudicial declarations relevant for
that purpose? Presumably, each such declaration constituted an
implied assertion by the declarant that the auditor of the declaration was a bookmaker. Could each of the "several" declarants have
been mistaken with regard to that implied assertion? Of course.
Each could have dialed incorrectly. 10 7" Each could have been acting

on the basis of incorrect (extrajudicial) declarations made to him
by someone else. Each could have been an acquaintance of the expected auditor who, alone or with the other callers, engaged in
"friendly" no-money-changes-hands betting with the anticipated
auditor. Might cross-examination of the several declarants have revealed any one of those benign explanations? Certainly. That's
what cross-examination is all about.
But given the court's conclusion that the extrajudicial declarations were nonhearsay, the declarations were deemed admissible to
inculpate the accused in circumstances in which the accused would
have no opportunity to confront or cross-examine the declarants.
That, in turn, implicates the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment. 10 8 Ther confrontation clause assures the accused the
state of mind. Consequently, Rule 803(3) explicitly excludes receipt of state of mind declarations when offered to prove the existence of the facts remembered or believed. Therefore,
the "facts" asserted and identified in the text would not be provable by the quoted
declaration.
106. 492 F. Supp. at 466 n.7.
107. To the reader who may be skeptical about the likelihood of several callers dialing
the same incorrect number, I offer a personal anecdote. Some years ago, I received a number
of late-night and very-early-morning calls from different men who thought they were calling
a house of assignation. Upon complaining to the phone company, I was told that the company had very recently installed a phone for a new customer and that phone number was
but one digit different from mine. Given the apparent use being made of the phone by the
new customer, the phone company terminated the service. Almost immediately thereafter, I
stopped receiving the late-night and very-early-morning calls.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
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right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."1 0 In its
most definitive application of the confrontation clause, Ohio v.
Roberts,1 10 the Supreme Court concluded that hearsay declarations
would be admissible against the accused only if (1) the declarant
was unavailable and such unavailability was not attributable to
prosecutorial misconduct or neglect,'
and (2) the extrajudicial
declaration was shown to possess "adequate indicia of reliability. 1 12 With regard to those "adequate indicia of reliability," the
Court wrote: "[rieliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."'' s
In Zenni, let's assume that the telephone declarants were unavailable to the government because of an inability to identify
them. Then, under Roberts, the next question to be asked is did
the declarations fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Even
1 14
the Zenni court noted that "the prevailing common law view"
would have treated the declarations as hearsay and excluded them.
It was only under the more recent Federal Rules of Evidence (and
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801(a)) that the court found
the declarations to be admissible. Then, under Roberts, the question becomes whether there were particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. Given that the declarations were not made under
oath, or subject to the penalty of perjury, or in contemplation of
cross-examination," 5 and that they were not against any interest of
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him...." Id.
109. Id.
110. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). For a critical view of the narrow application of the confrontation clause in Roberts, see Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause, the Right Against SelfIncriminationand the Supreme Court: A Critiqueand Some Modest Proposals,20 DuQ. L.
REv.429, 430 (1982).
111. 448 U.S. at 65, 74.
112. Id. at 66.
113. Id. (footnote omitted).
114. 492 F. Supp. at 467.
115. In Roberts, the extrajudicial declarations had been made at the preliminary hearing where declarant was under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury, and should have
contemplated the possibility of examination by both prosecution and defense counsel. 448
U.S. at 58. Subsequent applications of Roberts have made it clear that the requirement of
reliability may be satisfied in other circumstances without the declarations having been
made under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury, or in contemplation of cross-examination. See, e.g., United States v. Regilia, 669 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1133 (1982) (coconspirator's declaration admissible against defendant as firmly rooted hearsay exception, irrespective of any prior opportunity to examine declarant); United States v.
Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981) (declarations of unavailable coconspirators admissible
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the declarants, and that each could have been the product of incorrect dialing, misinformation, or wholly friendly "betting," the required particularized guarantees of trustworthiness would seem to
have been lacking. Thus, under Roberts, the Zenni court's conclusion may have violated the right of confrontation of the accused.
That, too, it seems to me, is a persuasive reason for rejecting the
Advisory Committee Note's apparent desire to have such implied
assertions treated as nonhearsay. That characterization seems destined to generate decisions which may be in contravention of the
sixth amendment.
But the Advisory Committee Note and the Zenni opinion would
have such assertions characterized as nonhearsay. Does that characterization make the confrontation clause inapplicable? I think
not. Even the Advisory Committee recognized that those categories
it would have labeled nonhearsay were, "arguably, in effect . . .
assertion[s] of the existence of the condition [sought to be proved]
and hence properly includable within the hearsay concept." ' 6 The
nonhearsay characterization was a judgment call or arbitrary determination made by the Committee. Such a determination cannot
negate the constitutional guarantee of the confrontation clause
when the evils to be met by the clause in fact exist. To put it more
broadly, the Advisory Committee lacked the capacity to diminish
or amend the sixth amendment. Yet the Zenni court, in holding
that the telephone declarations were admissible, never considered
the confrontation right of the accused. Apparently, having characterized the declarations as nonhearsay, the court failed to recognize
the applicability of that basic constitutional right. That judicial
oversight, seemingly arising from the nonhearsay characterization
propounded by the Advisory Committee Note, is, I believe, a significant additional reason for rejecting that characterization.
Nor is Zenni unique in failing to appreciate the significance of
the confrontation clause, once having embraced the Advisory Committee's characterization of nonhearsay. In United States v. Jackson,1 17 the defendants, Jackson and Porter, were convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and possession of heroin with intent to
distribute. A government witness, Linda Johnson, testified that she
against defendant as firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, irrespective of any prior opportunity
to examine declarants); Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981) (state of mind declarations admissible against defendant as firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, irrespective of any
prior opportunity to examine declarant).
116. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee note.
117. 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1979).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:741

had met Porter in Los Angeles in 1977. Johnson testified that, at
that time, Porter invited her to his family reunion in Birmingham,
Alabama. According to Johnson's testimony, on July 6, 1977, a woman she did not know visited Johnson at her apartment. The woman gave Johnson $130 for air fare to Birmingham and handed
Johnson a small canvas bag which the woman asked Johnson to
pack with her other things. The woman told Johnson that Porter
would meet her at the airport in Birmingham. 11 8 When narcotics
agents seized the canvas bag at the Birmingham airport, they
found that the bag contained heroin.
On appeal, the defendants argued that Johnson's testimony as to
what the unidentified woman had said to her should have been excluded as hearsay and in contravention of their sixth amendment
right to confront the witnesses against them. With regard to the
hearsay argument, this was the court's response:
We disagree. The Federal Rules of Evidence exclude from the operation of
the hearsay rule any oral statement not intended as an assertion. Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(a). Furthermore an out-of-court statement that is not
offered as proof of the matter asserted therein is not hearsay. Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(c). We think that the out-of-court statements fall within
that class of" 'cases in which the utterance is contemporaneous with a nonverbal act, independently admissible, relating to that act and throwing some
light upon it.'" United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 377 (2d Cir.
1961) (quoting Morgan, A Suggested Classificationof Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 239 (1922))."1

With regard to the confrontation clause argument, the court's response was perfunctory: "[s]ince the unidentified woman in Los
Angeles was not a witness against the appellants, there was no
'1 20
Confrontation Clause violation in this case.
Let's begin with the court's characterization of the unidentified
woman's extrajudicial declarations as res gestae. In support of that
characterization, the court cited a pre-Rules case and a 1922 article. Why nothing more recent? Well, res gestae has always been a
little bit suspect as a loose evidentiary grab-bag, 121 and, arguably,
118. Id. at 1049 n.4.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Watts v. Smith, 226 A.2d 160, 162 (D.C. 1967): "Res gestae is a loose
evidentiary term encompassing several hearsay exceptions: verbal acts, statements indicating the mental condition of the declarant, and spontaneous declarations. JONES, EVIDENCE §§
318-319 (1958);" E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 836 (3d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted):
"Commentators and, less frequently, courts, have criticized use of the phrase res gestae. Its
vagueness and imprecision are, of course, apparent."
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has no place under the Federal Rules of Evidence, with their spe22
cific hearsay exceptions and circumspective residual exceptions.'
How about the court's characterization of the extrajudicial declarations as oral statements "not intended as an assertion" and "not
offered as proof of the matter asserted therein" and, therefore, not
hearsay under Rule 801(a) and (c)? The unidentified woman told
Johnson, among other things, that Porter would meet Johnson at
the Birmingham airport. Surely, that was intended as an assertion.
It would seem to have served no nonassertive function. And, just as
surely, the government wanted the jury to hear that assertion for
the very purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted
therein, that Porter intended to meet Johnson in Birmingham,
thus demonstrating Porter's connivance in transporting the heroin
from Los Angeles to Birmingham.
It's a little bit difficult to know what to say about the court's
language refuting the confrontation clause argument. The court's
language seems to stand the clause on its head: because the government did not call declarant to the stand, defendants' confrontation rights were not violated. Of course, it was that very failure to
present the declarant that was the gist of the confrontation clause
assertion. The government inculpated Porter (and thereby his alleged coconspirator Jackson) with the extrajudicial declarations of
the unidentified woman without affording the defendants any opportunity to confront and cross-examine her in the presence of the
jury that was to decide the guilt or innocence of the defendants. As
in Zenni, the court's conclusion that Rule 801(a) and (c) excluded
the extrajudicial declarations from the hearsay rule seems to have
contributed to the court's (here explicit) determination that the
confrontation rights of the defendants had not been violated.
In United States v. Perez,'2 s defendant Ruvalcaba appealed his
conviction of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and distribution of
122. Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 509, 509 n.1 (3d Cir. 1985). The court noted that
"this terminology [res gestael is inappropriate. . . . [T]here is no such exception to the
prohibition against hearsay. . . . If admissible, the declarations must qualify under one of
the genuine exceptions to the hearsay rule. The old catchall, 'res gestae,' is no longer part of
the law of evidence."
1. As Wigmore notes, "res gestae" literally means "the thing done" and properly applies only to words that accompany and aid in giving legal significance to the act.
Such words are treated as "verbal acts." Before adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, courts applied "res gestae" with much confusion to hearsay statements of
various sorts. 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1745 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976).
Id.
123. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
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cocaine. Ruvalcaba argued that there had been inadequate evidence presented of the existence of a conspiracy and his connection with that conspiracy to justify receiving against him certain
declarations of alleged coconspirators. At trial, a part of the evidence received tending to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy and Ruvalcaba's connection with it consisted of extrajudicial
declarations made by alleged conspirator Perez to Cazares, an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency.124 Immediately
after receiving a telephone call, Perez gave Ruvalcaba's name, address and phone number to Cazares for the purpose of contact in
the event that a planned transaction would have to be made in Los
Angeles. Over objection, Cazares was permitted to testify to Perez'
declarations to Cazares after the phone call. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that ruling, concluding first that "Perez' verbal conduct acknowledging that the caller was Ruvalcaba, whether express or implied, was an implied assertion and admissible as nonassertive
conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a), (c). Consequently,
• . .Cazares.

.

.could properly testify to Perez' acknowledgement

over a double-hearsay objection. 12' Then, as to the first level of
hearsay, Ruvlacaba's alleged telephone conversation, the court concluded that the "call was admissible as either an admission under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) or as nonassertive conduct
1 26
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a), (c)."

With regard to the court's first conclusion, it's difficult to understand how Perez' declarations to Cazares would implicate Ruvalcaba as a coconspirator if those declarations were not equivalent to
implied assertions of that fact. To characterize those declarations
as "implied" and therefore "nonassertive conduct," consequently
admissible under "801(a), (c)," seems to overlook the practical considerations that (1) even an implied assertion may be assertive,
and (2) these particular declarations would have been relevant to
implicate Ruvalcaba as a conspirator only to the extent that they
asserted, expressly or impliedly, that Ruvalcaba was a member of
the conspiracy.
With regard to the court's second conclusion, and the italicized
language "supporting" it, it's difficult to understand how Ruvalcaba's alleged telephone declarations would be relevant evidence of
his participation in the conspiracy if those declarations were
124. Id. at 657.
125. Id. at 659.
126. Id. (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
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"nonassertive conduct." It would seem that those declarations
would implicate Ruvalcaba in the conspiracy only if the declarations were equivalent to assertions of some degree of involvement
therein.
A considerably more realistic judicial view was manifested in
27
United States v. Caro.1
The Fifth Circuit reversed defendant's
conviction of conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute.
The basis of the reversal was the court's conclusion that the government had failed to present sufficient admissible evidence to justify a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In an effort
to sustain the conviction on appeal, the government pointed to the
testimony of DEA Agent Baden12 8 of his questioning of Casillas, an
alleged coconspirator of the defendant, after Casillas' arrest and
the termination of the alleged conspiracy, 2 s and Baden's reaction
to that questioning:
Q. (By Mr. Walker:) Did you ask Mr. Casillas any questions?
A. [By Agent Baden:] Yes, sir, I did.
Q. All right, what questions did you ask Mr. Casillas?
A. I asked Mr. Casillas to whom the heroin belonged. I asked him where he
was supposed to take the money to after he received it from the undercover
agents. I asked him to whom the automobile belonged to that he was
driving.
Q. Okay.
A. I asked him if he would take us to the place and the person to whom he
was to pay the money.
Q. Following this conversation that you had with Mr. Casillas, what did you
do then, if anything?
A. I participated with the other agents, sir, and we went out to Moon City
[where defendant apparently resided], about four or five vehicles, I believe
altogether, sir.'3 0

The government apparently argued that (1) since Casillas' responses had not been testified to by Agent Baden, his testimony
was nonhearsay and (2) from Baden's reaction to those (untestified
to) responses, a reasonable jury could infer that Casillas had identified the defendant as the source of the heroin. The Fifth Circuit
wasn't having any: "We are.

. .

unable to accord much weight on

our review to other evidence which, while arguably outside the
realm of technical hearsay, can only be taken as supporting the
government's case on the basis of inferences too speculative for a
127.
128.
129.
130.

569 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 415.
Id. at 415, 416, 417 n.10.
Id. at 417 n.10.
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reasonable jury to have accorded them much weight.' 1 31 The underlying evil perceived by the court in the agent's artful testimony
was precisely identified by the court:
[Tihis court has been receptive to treating certain implied assertions as
hearsay in order to prevent circumvention of the hearsay rule "through
clever questioning and coaching of witnesses," Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923,
928 (5th Cir. 1974), reversed on other grounds, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 ... (1975).

In the circumstances of this case, we need not decide whether this testimony was properly admissible; we note merely that no evidence was introduced to indicate how, if at all, Casillas responded to the agent's questions
We view any inferences that might be drawn from this contested evidence
as simply too speculative to be accorded weight on our review of the sufficiency of evidence against Caro. " '

The evil perceived by the court could just as easily exist in any
testimony of "implied assertions" offered to prove something other
than the matter asserted. Think of our earlier hypotheticals involving the "crawl" and "cab" declarations offered to prove that the
wrongful death action defendant had been too drunk to drive. Selective recollection by the witness or "clever questioning and
coaching"' 3 of the witness could have resulted in the witness' testimony excluding any explicit assertion by declarant of the defendant's intoxication, in the hope of circumventing the hearsay rule,
and including only the "implied assertion" of intoxication, in the
hope of bringing into play the Advisory Committee's desire to have
such assertions characterized as nonhearsay. While that evil may
be especially pernicious in a criminal prosecution, where the defendant's liberty is at stake, it is hardly desirable in a civil action.
Such artful testimony, perhaps the product of "clever questioning
and coaching" of the witness, would seem to constitute another
reason for rejecting the Advisory Committee Note's propounded
characterization of such declarations as nonhearsay. Moreover, just
as the Caro court found that the inferences the government would
have had the jury draw from Agent Baden's testimony were "too
speculative," we have seen that, as the disparity between the extrajudicial declaration and the inferred fact sought to be proved becomes greater, the relevancy of the declaration becomes more remote. That strain between the nonhearsay characterization and the
131. Id. at 416-17.
132. Id. at 417 n.10.
133. Id.
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relevancy of the extrajudicial declaration is inherent in the Advisory Committee's proposed resolution.
The Advisory Committee Note's desire to have "verbal conduct
which is assertive but offered as the basis for inferring something
other than the matter asserted, . . . excluded from the definition
of hearsay,"134 is (1) not well supported by the Note's reasoning,

(2) not compelled by the language of Rule 801, (3) not reflected in
the legislative history of the Rule, (4) certain to generate an inherent and generally insoluble strain between the nonhearsay characterization and relevancy, (5) incompatible with the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment, and (6) calculated to encourage
"clever questioning and coaching of witnesses" in an effort to generate testimony artfully fashioned to comply with the Note's desire. For all of those reasons, and to preserve the efficacy of crossexamination, I think the Committee's desire should be rejected by
the courts and that such implied assertions should be deemed to
retain their traditional characterization as hearsay.

134.

FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee note.

